Academics / Courses / DescriptionsCOMP_SCI 432: Mechanism Design
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Prerequisites
PhD in CS, or PhD Econ, or PhD IEMS or PhD CS+LS or PhD TSB or Kellogg PhD MECS or Permission of Instructor.Description
This course studies the design of mechanisms to mediate the interaction of strategic individuals so that desirable outcomes are attained. A central theme will be the tradeoff between optimality of an objective such as revenue or welfare and other desirable properties such as simplicity, robustness, computational tractability, and practicality. This tradeoff will be quantified by a theory of approximation which measures the loss of performance of a simple, robust, and practical approximation mechanism in comparison to the complicated and delicate optimal mechanism. The class focuses on techniques for performing this analysis, economic conclusions, and consequences for practice. The class will follow the textbook manuscript at: http://jasonhartline.com/MDnA/ - Syllabus.
- Formerly Comp_Sci 496 - last offer was Fall 2021
- This course satisfies CS Technical Elective.
COURSE COORDINATOR: Prof. Jason Hartline
COURSE INSTRUCTOR : Prof. Hartline
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